We argue that the analysis of agent environment i n teractions should be extended to include the conventions and invariants maintained by agents throughout their activity. We refer to this thicker notion of environment a s a lifeworld and present a partial set of formal tools for describing structures of lifeworlds and the ways in which they computationally simplify activity. As one speci c example, we apply the tools to the analysis of the Toast system and show h o w v ersions of the system with very di erent control structures in fact implement a common control structure together with di erent conventions for encoding task state in the positions or states of objects in the environment.
Introduction
Biologists have long sought concepts to describe the ways in which organisms are adapted to their environments. Social scientists have likewise sought concepts to describe the ways in which people become acculturated participants in the social worlds around them. Yet it has been di cult to approach these phenomena with the methods of computational modeling. We can see at least two reasons for this di culty. The rst is that the tradition of modeling in arti cial intelligence developed around a concern with cognition, that is, mental processes understood to intervene between stimuli and responses in human beings. Although minority traditions such as ecological psychology reacted against this approach to studying human life, they have not been able to translate their concepts into computational mechanisms that match the expressive power of symbolic programming. The second reason is more subtle: if one conceives both organisms and their environments as spatially extended mechanisms that can beexplained according to the same principles then the boundary between them the surface of the body is not particularly di erent from, or more interesting than, the rest of the total organism-environment system. The challenge for computational modeling, then, is to conceptualize agents' adaptations to their environments in ways that neither treat agents as isolated black b o xes or dissolve them into one big machine.
For these purposes, we nd it useful to distinguish between two aspects of an agent's involvement in its familiar environment: its embodiment and its embedding. Embodiment" pertains to an agent's life as a body: the niteness of its resources, its limited perspective on the world, the indexicality of its perceptions, its physical locality, its motility, and so on. Embedding" pertains to the agent's structural relationship to its world: its habitual paths, its customary practices and how they t in with the shapes and workings of things, its connections to other agents, its position in a set of roles or a hierarchy, and so forth. The concept of embedding, then, extends from more concrete kinds of locatedness in the world places, things, actions to more abstract kinds of location within social systems, ecosystems, cultures, and so on. Embodiment and embedding are obviously interrelated, and they each h a ve p o werful consequences both for agents' direct dealings with other agents and for their solitary activities in the physical world. Our principal focus in this article is on embedding, and particularly on the ways in which agents maintain relationships to objects that are functionally signi cant for their tasks.
In this paper we develop some thoughts about embodiment and embedding as follows:
Section 2 reviews the concept of the environment a s i t d e v eloped with the early work of Newell and Simon. Section 3 introduces our own adaptation of the traditional idea, which we call lifeworlds, and we s k etch what is involved in lifeworld analysis. Section 4 introduces informally the concept of factorization of lifeworlds; this refers roughly to the structures of the lifeworld that permit agents' decisions to bemade independently of one another. Section 5 de nes the basics of our formal theory of lifeworld analysis, namely the concepts of environments, actions, policies, factorization, and the reduction of one environment to another. The purpose of this formalism is to characterize the kinds of interactions that can arise between agents and their familiar lifeworlds. Section 6 brie y introduces the computer program we wrote to illustrate some of the phenomena of lifeworlds. Section 7 then applies our formalism to modeling the world in which our program operates; it proceeds by modeling successively more complicated versions of this world. Section 8 explains how our program keeps track of the objects in the world that gure in its activities, and discusses the issues that arise when trying to model this keeping-track in formal terms. Section 9 sums up our formal work by explaining the precise relationship between the program and the formal model of its world. Section 10 then expands our theory of lifeworlds more informally by i n troducing the concept of cognitive autopoiesis, which is the collection of means by which agents manipulate their surroundings to provide the conditions of their own cognitive processes; we provide a taxonomy of these phenomena. Section 11 concludes by suggesting some directions for future work.
The Concept of the Environment
Intuitively, the notion of the environment" in AI and robotics refers to the relatively enduring and stable set of circumstances that surround some given individual. My environment i s probably not the same as yours, though they may be similar. On the other hand, although my e n vironment starts where I leave o at my skin, perhaps, it has no clear ending-point. Nor is it necessarily de ned in terms of metric space; if physically distant circumstances have consequences for my life via the telephone, say then they are properly regarded as part of my e n vironment a s w ell. The environment is where agents live, and it determines the e ects of their actions. The environment i s t h us a matter of importance in computational modeling; only if we know what an agent's environment is like can we determine if a given pattern of behavior is adaptive. In particular we need a positive theory of the environment, that is, some kind of principled characterization of those structures or dynamics or other attributes of the environment in virtue of which adaptive behavior is adaptive.
Herbert Simon discussed the issue in his pre-AI work. His book Administrative Behavior 1947, for example, presents the in uential theory that later became known as limited rationality. In contrast to the assumption of rational choice in classical economics, Simon describes a range of cognitive limitations that make fully rational decision-making in organizations impracticable. Yet organizations thrive a n yway, he argues, because they provide each individual with a structured environment that ensures that their decisions are good enough. The division of labor, for example, compensates for the individual's limited ability to master a range of tasks. Structured ows of information, likewise, compensate for the individual's limited ability t o seek this information out and judge its relevance. Hierarchy compensates for the individual's limited capacity to choose goals. And xed procedures compensate for individuals' limited capacity to construct procedures for themselves.
In comparison to Simon's early theory in Administrative Behavior, AI has downplayed the distinction between agent and environment. In Newell and Simon's early work on problem solving 1963, the environment is reduced to the discrete series of choices that it presents in the course of solving a given problem. The phrase task environment" came to refer to the formal structure of the search space of choices and outcomes. This is clearly a goodway of modeling tasks such as logical theorem-proving and chess, in which the objects being manipulated are purely formal. For tasks that involve activities in the physical world, however, the picture is more complex. In such cases, the problem solving model analyzes the world in a distinctive w ay. Their theory does not treat the world and the agent as separate constructs. Instead, the world shows up, so to speak, phenomenologically: in terms of the di erences that make a di erence for this agent, given its particular representations, actions, and goals. Agents with di erent perceptual capabilities and action repertoires, for example, will inhabit di erent task environments, even though their physical surroundings and goals might be identical.
Newell and Simon's theory of the task environment, then, tends to blur the di erence between agent and environment. As a framework for analysis, we nd the phenomenological approach v aluable, and we wish to adapt it to our own purposes. Unfortunately, Newell and Simon carry this blurring into their theory of cognitive architecture. They are often unclear whether problem solving is an activity that takes place wholly within the mind, or whether it unfolds through the agent's potentially complicated interactions with the physical world. This distinction does not arise in cases such as theorem-proving and chess, or in any other domain whose workings are easily simulated through mental reasoning. But it is crucial in any domain whose actions have uncertain outcomes. Even though we wish to retain Newell and Simon's phenomenological approach to task analysis, therefore, we do not wish to presuppose that our agents reason by conducting searches in problem spaces. Instead, we wish to develop an analytical framework that can guide the design of a wide range of agent architectures. In particular, we w ant an analytical framework that will help us design the simplest possible architecture for any given task.
Lifeworlds
We will use the term lifeworld to mean an environment described in terms of the customary ways of structuring the activities that take place within it | the conventional uses of tools and materials, the loop invariants" that are maintained within it by conventional activities, and so on. The term originally comes from phenomenological sociology Schutz & Luckmann, 1973 , where it refers to the familiar world of everyday life, and speci cally to that world as described in the terms that make a di erence for a given way of life. Cats and people, for example, can beunderstood as inhabiting the same physical environment but di erent lifeworlds. Kitchen cupboards, window sills, and the spaces underneath chairs have di erent signi cances for cats and people, as do balls of yarn, upholstery, television sets, and other cats. Similarly, a kitchen a ords a di erent kind of lifeworld to a chef than to a mechanic, though clearly these two lifeworlds may o verlap in some ways as well. A lifeworld, then, is not just a physical environment, but the patterned ways in which a physical environment is functionally meaningful within some activity.
This idea is similar to Gibson's theory of perception 1986, but the two theories also di er in important w ays. Whereas Gibson believes that the perception of worldly a ordances is direct, we believe that the perceptual process can beexplained in causal terms. Also, whereas Gibson treated the categories of perception as essentially biological and innate, we regard them as cultural and emergent.
In analyzing a lifeworld, one attempts to draw out the individual structures within it that facilitate its customary activities. For example, lifeworlds typically contain artifacts such as tools that have been speci cally evolved to support those activities. These tools are also arranged in the world in ways that simplify life and reduce the cognitive burden on individuals: cups are typically found in cupboards, food in refrigerators and grocery stores. No one needs to remember where butter is found in a speci c grocery store because butter in all grocery stores is found in a well-de ned dairy section, usually along a wall, which can be recognized from a distance; once the dairy section is in view, the butter will be visible in a de nite area. Artifacts are also designed to make their functional properties perceptually obvious. Handles are perceptibly suited for picking up, knobs are perceptibly suited for turning, forks are perceptibly suited for impaling things, and so on Brady, Agre, Braunegg, & Connell, 1984; Winston, Binford, Katz, & Lowry, 1983 . Contrarily, it can generally be assumed that artifacts that provide no readily perceptible grounds for drawing functional distinctions are in fact interchangeable. Usually, when some functionally signi cant property o f an object is not obvious, the lifeworld provides some alternate way of marking it. If you see a record player in my house, for example, then you will assume that it is mine unless you have some speci c reason not to. These aspects of lifeworlds tend to make it easy to perform particular kinds of activities within them without having to remembertoomany facts or reinvent the screwdriver from rst principles.
Lifeworlds contain networks of interacting conventions and practices that simplify speci c aspects of speci c activities. The practices relieve agents of the burden of solving certain problems on the spot and di use their solutions throughout the activity of the agent or of many agents. For example, a hospital might try to get along without maintaining sterile conditions. People always have germs, so technically they are always infected. The problem is making sure that those infections never get out of control. The most direct solution would beconstantly to monitor patients, assess their degree of infection and treat them when it becomes severe. Since this is undesirable for any n umber of reasons, a hospital instead tries to prevent infections in patients by maintaining sterile conditions. They might do this, for example, by looking for contaminated objects and surfaces and disinfecting them. Unfortunately, sterility is not a visible surface characteristic. Instead, hospitals solve the problem by structuring space and activity. Di erent locations are kept more or less sterile depending on their conventional uses: operating rooms are more sterile than hallway oors. Objects that can generate germs people are washed, masked, and gloved. Critical instruments that come in contact with them are specially sterilized after use. Tongue depressors are assumed to be dirty when they are in the trash can or biohazard bag and clean when they are wrapped in paper. All objects and surfaces are periodically disinfected regardless of their level of contamination. These practices are maintained regardless of the immediate need for them. If a hospital were for some reason to temporarily nd itself without any patients, its workers would not stop washing their hands or disinfecting the bathrooms.
Factorization of Lifeworlds
Simon, in Sciences of the Arti cial 1970, argued that complex systems had to be nearly decomposable." His model for this was the rooms in a building, whose walls tend to minimize the e ects that activity in one room has upon activity in another. Sussman 1975, in his analysis of block-stacking tasks, classi ed several types of subgoal interactions" that result from attempts to break tasks down into subtasks; one hopes that these tasks will be decomposable, but bugs arise when they are not decomposable enough. One assumes that a task is decomposable unless one has reason to believe otherwise. Sussman's research, and the rich tradition of planning research that it helped inaugurate, concerned the di cult problem of constructing plans in the presence of subgoal interactions. Our goal, complementary to theirs, is to analyze the many w ays in which tasks really are decomposable, and to derive the broadest range of conditions under which moment-to-moment activity can proceed without extensive analysis of potential interactions.
A non-pathological lifeworld will be structured in ways that limit or prevent i n teractions among subtasks. Some of these structures might be taxonomized as follows: Activity partition. Most lifeworlds separate activities under discrete headings: sewing is a distinct activity from bathing, gathering foodis a separate activity from giving birth, and so on. These distinctions provide the basis for reckoning di erent activities" for the purposes of most of the rest of the partitions. The boundaries among the various activities are often marked through some type of ritual.
Spatial partition. Di erent things are often done in di erent places. Tasks may be con ned to the places where their associated tools or materials are stored, or where suitable conditions or lighting or safety obtain. These places may even beclose together, as when di erent recipes are prepared in di erent sections of countertop space or di erent kinds of food are kept in di erent parts of one's plate, with boundary regions perhaps employed to assemble forkfuls of neighboring foods. In general, activities are arranged in space, and decisions made in one place tend to have minimal interaction with decisions made in other places. Of course spatial distance brings no absolute guarantees about functional independence using up all the resources at one location will prevent them from being carted to another location for another use later on, so these are just general tendencies.
Material partition. Di erent activities often involve di erent materials, so that decisions that a ect the materials in one activity do not interact with decisions that a ect the materials of the other activity.
Temporal partition. Di erent activities often take place at di erent times, thus limiting the channels through which they might constrain one another. These times might bestandardized points during the cycle of the day or week, or their ordering might beconstrained by some kind of precondition that the rst activity produces and successive ones depend upon.
Role partition. Simon pointed out that division of labor eases cognitive burdens. It does this in part by supplying individuals with separate spheres in which to conduct their respective activities.
Background maintenance. Many activities have background conditions that are maintained without reference to speci c goals. For example, one maintains stocks of supplies in the pantry, puts things back where they belong, and so forth. Hammond, Converse, and Grass 1995 call some of these stabilization." See Section 5. What these practices stabilize are the relationships between an agent and the materials used in its customary activities. They tend to ensure, for example, that one will encounter one's hammer or the currently opened box of corn akes in de nite sorts of recurring situations. They thus reduce the complexity of life, and the variety of di erent hassles that arise, by encouraging the rise of routine patterns and cycles of activity rather than a constant stream of unique puzzles.
Attributes of tools. Numerous properties of tools limit the interactions among separate decisions. Virtually all tools are resettable, meaning that regardless of what one has been doing with them, they can be restored to some normal state within which their full range of functionalities is accessible. This of course assumes that one has only been using the tools in the customary ways and has not been breaking them. Thus the properties of the tool do not place any ordering constraints on the activities that use it. Likewise, most tools are not committed to tasks over long periods. Once you have turned a screw with a screwdriver, for example, the screwdriver does not stay stuck" to that screw for any long period. Thus it is not necessary to schedule the use of a screwdriver unless several people wish to use it at once. Exceptions to this general rule include bowls whose ingredients must often sit waiting for future actions or conditions, and which cannot contain anything else in the meantime, stove burners which sometimes must remain committed to heating particular dishes until they have reached certain states and not before, and clamps which m ust remain fastened until the glue has dried or the sawing operations have been completed.
Supplies of tools. These latter tools raise the spectre of generalized scheduling problems and the potential for deadlock among multiple activities, and such problems do in fact sometimes arise when cooking for more people than the numberto which a given kitchen is adapted. Most of the time, though, one solves such problems not through scheduling but simply through having enough of the tools that must remain committed to particular purposes over a period of time. Lansky and Fogelsong 1987 modeled the e ects on search spaces of limited interactions between di erent cooks using overlapping sets of tools.
Warning signs. When things go wrong, unpleasant subgoal interactions can ensue. To a void such di culties, an individual, community, or species keeps track o f w arning signs and cultivates the capacity to notice them; these warning signs include supplies running low and funny smells. This is often done on a primitive associative level, as when rats stay a way from smells that were associated with stu that made them sick or people develop phobias about things that were present when they su ered traumas. Communities often arrange for certain warning signs to become obtrusive, as when kettles whistle or natural gas is mixed with another gas that has a distinctive smell.
Simple impossibility. Sometimes things are just impossible, and obviously so, so that it is not necessary to invest great e ort in deciding not to do them.
Monotonicity. Many actions or changes of state are irreversible. Irreversible changes cause decisions to interact when certain things must be done before the change takes place. But it also provides a structure for the decision process: the lifeworld needs to make it evident what must be done before a given irreversible change occurs.
Flow paths. Often a lifeworld will be arranged so that particular materials parts on an assembly line, paperwork in an organization, food on its way from refrigerator to stove to table follow de nite paths. These paths then provide a great deal of structure for decision-making. By inspecting various points along a path, for example, one can see what needs to be done next. Or by determining where an object is, one can determine what must be done to it and where it must be taken afterward. Some of these paths are consciously mapped out and others are emergent properties of a set of customs.
Cycles. Likewise, many lifeworlds involve stable cycles of activities, perhaps with some of the cycles nested inside of others. The resulting rhythms are often expressed in recurring combinations of materials, decisions, spatial arrangements, warning signs, and so on.
Externalized state. To computer people, state" used as a mass noun means discernible di erences in things that can be modi ed voluntarily, and that can be interpreted as functionally signi cant i n some way. Early AI did not treat internal state memory and external state functionally signi cant m utable states of the world as importantly di erent, and it is often analytically convenient to treat them in a uniform fashion. It is often advantageous to record state in the world, whether in the relative locations of things and the persistent states in the count noun sense that they are left in Beach, 1988 . For example, one need not rememberwhether the eggs have been broken if that fact is readily perceptible, if one's attention will be drawn to it on a suitable occasion, and if one understands its signi cance for the task. Likewise, one can save a great deal of memory by retrieving all of the ingredients for an evening's recipes from the cupboards and placing them in a customary place on the shelf. Lifeworlds, then, have a great deal of structure that permits decisions to be made independently of one another. The point i s not that real lifeworlds permit anyone to live in a 100 reactive" mode, without performing any signi cant computation, or even that this would be desirable. The point, rather, is that the nontrivial cognition that people do perform takes place against a very considerable background of familiar and generally reliable dynamic structure.
The factorability of lifeworlds helps particularly in understanding the activities of an agent with a body. A great deal of focusing is inherent i n e m bodiment. If you can only look in one place at a time, or handle only one tool at a time, your activities will necessarily beserial. Your attention will have a certain degree of hysteresis: having gotten to work on one countertop or using one particular tool, for example, the most natural step is to carry on with that same task. It is crucial, therefore, that di erent tasks be relatively separate in their consequences, that the lifeworld provide clues when a change of task is necessary, and that other functionally signi cant conditions can generally be detected using general-purpose forms of vigilance such as occasionally looking around. Of course, certain kinds of activities are more complex than this, and they require special-purpose strategies that go beyond simple heuristic policies such as nd something that needs doing and do it." The point is that these more complex activities with many i n teracting components are rare, that they are generally conducted in specially designed or adapted lifeworlds, and that most lifeworlds are structured to minimize the di culty of tasks rather than to increase it.
These various phenomena together formed the motivation for the concept of indexicalfunctional or deictic representation Agre & Chapman, 1987; Agre, 1997 . Embodied agents are focused on one activity and one set of objects at a time; many of these objects are specically adapted for that activity; their relevant states are generally readily perceptible; objects which are not perceptibly di erent are generally interchangeable; and stabilization practices help ensure that these objects are encountered in standardized ways. It thus makes sense, for most purposes, to represent objects in generic ways through one's relationships to them. The ashlight I k eep in the car is the-ashlight-I-keep-in-the-car and not FLASHLIGHT-13. I maintain a stable relationship to this ashlight b y k eeping it in a standard place, putting it back there when I am done with it, using it only for its intended purposes, keeping its batteries fresh, and so on. Its presence in the environment ensures that I have ready access to light when my car breaks down at night, and therefore that I need not separately plan for that contingency each time I drive. The conventional structures of my own activity maintain the ashlight's presence as a loop invariant." Both the presence of the ashlight and the activities that ensure it are structures of my lifeworld.
Environments, Policies, and Reducibility
In this section, we will introduce our formalism. The purpose of the formalism is not directly to specify the workings of the agent's cognitive machinery. Instead, its purpose is to construct principled characterizations of interactions between agents and their environments to guide explanation and design" Agre, 1995 . The formalism, in other words, describes an agent's embodied activities in a particular environment. Having characterized the dy-namics of those activities, it becomes possible to design suitable machinery. As a matter of principle, we want to design the simplest possible machinery that is consistent with a given pattern of interaction Horswill, 1995 . We therefore make n o a priori commitments about machinery. We do not favor any particular architecture until a particular activity has been analyzed. Nor do we make any a priori commitments about matters such as analog versus digital, planning" versus reaction," and so on. Our experience has been that real lifeworlds and real activities incorporate a great deal of useful dynamic structure, and that any e ort we i n vest in studying that structure will be repaid in parsimonious theories about machinery. But we intend our methods to beequally useful for investigating all types of activity and designing all types of machinery that might be able to participate in them.
The concept of a lifeworld will not appear as a speci c mathematical entity in our formalism. The intuition, however, is this: while there is an objective material environment, the agent does not directly deal with all of this environment's complexity. Instead it deals with a functional environment that is projected from the material environment. That projection is possible because of various conventions and invariants that are stably present in the environment or actively maintained by the agent. The lifeworld should be understood as this functional world together with the projection and the conventions that create it. This section summarizes the formal model of environmental specialization given by Horswill 1995; for proofs of the theorems, see the original paper. Subsequent sections will apply and extend the model.
We will model environments as state machines and the behavior of agents as policies mapping states to actions.
An environment E is a pair S; A where S is its state-space and A its set of possible actions.
An action a: S ! S is a mapping from states to states. A policy p: S ! A is a mapping from states to actions to be taken. In this paper, the states will only include facts about the physical environment, but it is a straightforward matter to include an agent's internal states as well Horswill, 1995 . The combination of a policy with an environment creates a dynamic system: the environment's state is mapped by the policy to an action that maps the environment to a new state and the whole process is repeated.
A discrete control problem DCP is a pair E;G o f a n e n vironment E and a goal G, which is some subset of E's state space.
A policy solves the problem if the dynamic system it generates with the environment eventually reaches a goal state.
It solves the problem and halts if it remains within G once entering it. For example, consider a robot moving along a corridor with n equally spaced o ces labeled 1, 2, 3, and so on. We can formalize this as the environment Z n = f0; 1; :::; n , 1g; finc n ; dec; ig, where i is the identity function, and where inc n and dec map an integer i to i + 1 and i , 1, respectively, with the proviso that dec0 = 0 and inc n n , 1 = n , 1 see Figure 1 . Note that the e ect of performing the identity action is to stay in the same state.
We emphasize that a p olicy is a model of an agent's behavior, not of the causal computational processes by which that behavior is exhibited. It speci es what an agent does in each state, not how it does it. It is thus a theoretical construct, not a data structure or algorithm in the agent's head. We will examine the implementation issues that surround policies in section 8.
Product Environments
The majority of the formal sections of this paper will explore the phenomenon of factoring. In particular, we will explore how policies for factorable environments can be composed from policies for the factors. In state-machine models of environments, factorization is the factorization of the state-space; the environment's state-space is a Cartesian product of other state-spaces. The environment, as a whole, is factorable" into its component sub-environments. For example, the position of the king on a chess board has row and column components. It can bethought of as the product" of those components, each if which is isomorphic to Z 8 since there are eight rows and eight columns. If we consider an environment in which a car drives through an 88 grid of city blocks, we see that it too is a kind of product of Z 8 with itself. Both environments have 88 grids as state spaces, but the car environment only allows one component t o c hange at a time, whereas the king environment allows both to change.
We m ust therefore distinguish di erent kinds of factorization. We will call the chessboard case the parallel product of Z 8 with itself, while the car case is its serial product. We will focus on another kind of factorization later. Let the Cartesian product of two functions f and g befg: a; b 7 ! fa; gb, and let i be the identity function. For two e n vironments E 1 = S 1 ; A 1 and E 2 = S 2 ; A 2 , we will de ne the parallel product to be E 1 kE 2 = S 1 S 2 ; fa 1 a 2 : a 1 2 A 1 ; a 2 2 A 2 g and the serial product to be E 1 * E 2 = S 1 S 2 ; fa 1 i : a 1 2 A 1 g f ia 2 : a 2 2 A 2 g
The products of DCPs are de ned in the obvious way: E 1 ; G 1 kE 2 ; G 2 = E 1 kE 2 ; G 1 G 2 E 1 ; G 1 * E 2 ; G 2 = E 1 * E 2 ; G 1 G 2 The state diagram for Z 2 * Z 2 is shown in Figure 1 .
We will say that an environment or DCP is parallel or serial separable if it is isomorphic to a product of environments or DCPs.
Solvability of Separable DCPs
The important property of separable DCPs is that their solutions can be constructed from solutions to their components:
Lemma 1 Let p 1 be a p olicy which solves D 1 and halts from all states in some set of initial states I 1 , and let p 2 be a policy which solves D 2 and halts from all states in I 2 . Then the policy px; y = p 1 xp 2 y solves D 1 kD 2 and halts from all states in I 1 I 2 . Note that here w e a r e using the convention of treating p, a function over pairs, as a function over two scalars.
Lemma 2 Let p 1 be a policy which solves D 1 from all states in some set of initial states I 1 , and let p 2 be a policy which solves D 2 from all states in I 2 . Then any policy for which px; y = p 1 xi or ip 2 y and y 2 G 2 ; x 6 2 G 1 px; y = p 1 xi x 2 G 1 ; y 6 2 G 2 px; y = ip 2 y will solve D 1 * D 2 and halt from all states in I 1 I 2 .
Note that the parallel and serial cases are di erent. One would expect the parallel case to be easier to solve because the policy can perform actions on both state components simultaneously. In fact it is more di cult because one is required to perform actions on both simultaneously and this leaves the agent n o w ay of preserving one solved subproblem while solving another. Consider a ip-op" environment F = f0; 1g; ff l i p g where f l i p x = 1 , x. F has the property that every state is accessible from every other state. F * F also has this property. F k F, however, does not. F k F has only one action, which ips both state components at once. Thus only two states are accessible from any given state in F kF: the state itself and its ip. As with the king, the problem is xed if we add the identity action to F. Then it is possible to leave one component of the product intact, while changing the other. The identity action, while su cient, is not necessary. A weaker, but still unnecessary, condition is that F have some action that always maps goal states to goal states.
Figure 2: A simple reduction from an environment E 0 to E. Here s and s 0 are corresponding states from the reduced and unreduced environments respectively and a and a 0 are corresponding actions. A projection is a simple reduction if it commutes" with actions, so that a 0 s 0 = as 0 , or alternatively, a 0 = a . Thus regardless of whether we take the projection before or after the action, we will achieve the same result.
Reduction
Another important kind of structure is when one environment can be considered an abstraction of another Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1960; Sacerdoti, 1974; Knoblock, 1989 . The abstract environment retains the fundamental structure of the concrete environment but removes unimportant distinctions among states. An abstract state corresponds to a set of concrete states and abstract actions correspond to complicated sequences of concrete actions.
We will say that a projection from an environment E 0 to another environment E is a mapping from the state space of E 0 to that of E. We will say that is a simple reduction of E 0 to E if for every action a of E, there is a corresponding action a 0 of E 0 such that for any state s 0 a 0 s 0 = as 0 or equivalently, that a 0 = a where is the function composition operator. We will say that a 0 is a -implementation of a and we will use A to denote the function mapping E-actions to their implementations in E 0 .
It is possible to de ne a much more powerful notion of reduction in which implementations are allowed to be arbitrary policies. It requires a fair amount of additional machinery, however, including the addition of state to the agent. Since simple reduction will su ce for our purposes, we will simply assert the following lemma, which is a direct consequence of the more general reduction lemma Horswill, 1995: Lemma 3 Let be a simple reduction from E 0 to some environment E and let E 0 ; G 0 be a DCP. If a policy p solves E; G 0 , then p = A p solves E 0 ; G 0 .
Related Work
Most formal models of environments use state-space descriptions of the environment, usually nite-state machines. Rosenschein and Kaelbling used nite state machines to represent both agent and environment 1987, 1989, 1986 . Their formalization allowed specialized mechanisms to be directly synthesized from descriptions of desired behavior and a formalization of the behavior of the environment. The formalization was powerful enough to form the basis of a programming language used to program a real robot. Later, Rosenschein developed a method for synthesizing automata whose internal states had provable correlations to the state of the environment given a set of temporal logic assertions about the dynamics of the environment. Donald and Jennings 1992 use a geometric, but similar, approach for constructing virtual sensors. Lyons and Arbib 1989 model both organisms and robots using process algebras, and Beer 1995 employs the formalisms of dynamic systems theory.
Wilson 1991 has speci cally proposed the classi cation of simulated environments based on the types of mechanisms which can operate successfully within them. Wilson also used a nite state formalization of the environment. He divided environments into three classes based on properties such as determinacy. Wilson 1993 and Todd et al. 1994 taxonomized grid worlds in terms of the behaviors that were successful in them. Littman 1993 used FSM models to classify environments for reinforcement learning algorithms. Littman parameterized the complexity of RL agents in terms of the amount of local storage they use and how far into the future the RL algorithm looks. He then empirically classi ed environments by the the minimal parameters that still allowed an optimal control policy to be learned.
There is also an extensive literature on discrete-event dynamic systems Ko seck a, 1992, which also model the environment as a nite state machine, but which assume that transition information rather than state information is visible to the agents.
An alternative to the state-machine formalism can be found in the work of Dixon 1991. Dixon derives his semantics from rst order logic, in which the world comes individuated into objects and relations, rather than on the state-space methods used here. Dixon's open" approach also avoids the need to de ne the environment as a single mathematical structure. Like this work, Dixon's work attempts to formally model the assumptions a system makes about its environment. Dixon's interest, however, is on what an individual program means rather than on comparing competing programs.
Toast
Toast Agre & Horswill, 1992 is a program that simulates a short-order cook in a reasonably detailed simulation of a kitchen see Figure 3 . In Toast, the world consists of a set of objects such a s o vens, pans, cutting boards, globs of pancake batter, individual eggs, and customers of the restaurant. Each object has a type e.g., EGG and all objects of a given type have a common set of possible states and a common set of possible operations that can beperformed on them. An action involves a set of objects of given types. The action can require that the objects bein speci ed states and it may change the states of those objects, but no others. For example, the MIX operation would involve objects of type reset to their initial states. For example, knives and spoons are used and dirtied in the process of cooking, but they are not end products of cooking and they are easily reset to their clean state by washing. Materials are objects that are end products of cooking but have state graphs that form linear chains. In other words, for any state of the material, there is exactly one other state that it can be brought to and there is exactly one action that can bring it there. For example, an egg being scrambled always goes through the series of states UNBROKEN, BROKEN, BEATEN, COOKED. In the UNBROKEN state, the only action available on an egg is BREAK, after which the only action available will be BEAT. Toast is given a stock of each type of object. As it runs, the customers give it goals orders to prepare speci c dishes. The goal speci es a type of material e.g., EGG". It is satis ed by putting some object of that type into its nished state. Which egg object is cooked does not matter. Toast manages a dynamic set of these goals and opportunistically overlaps their preparation as processes nish and scarce resources, such as stove burners, become free. Toast uses a surprisingly simple algorithm:
On each clock cycle of the simulator:
Choose a material already being cooked Look up the action needed to advance it to the next state If the action requires additional tools, then choose objects of the proper types If those objects are in their reset states then perform the action else choose one of the unreset tool objects look up and perform its reset action This algorithm is intentionally sketchy because we h a ve implemented many v ersions of it which we nd intuitively similar, but which have very di erent control structures and require very di erent correctness proofs. The task of the next section will be to draw out their similarities and produce a coherent theory of them.
The Toast algorithm has two i n teresting features:
Most of the algorithm proceeds by table-lookup.
The algorithm is stateless: no internal plans or models are stored in the agent; all information used to choose actions is stored in the world. We do not claim any v ast generality for the Toast architecture; we simply observe that the environmental regularities that Toast relies upon are common to many other environments, and we suggest that our method in arguing for Toast's architecture seems likely to extend to other types of structure in the environment. Although di erent v ersions of Toast rely on di erent structures, we will show below that all the versions rely on: 1. The factorability of the environment into individual objects. Factoring allows us to construct solutions to problems from solutions to subproblems for the individual factors. 2. The special properties of the tool and material object classes. 3. The maintenance of invariants in the agent's own activity that introduce new structure into the environment. The formalization of the properties of tools and materials is simple. The precise formalization of factorability into objects, however, is surprisingly di cult because the environment is not directly factorable using the methods we h a ve developed so far. We will solve the problem by de ning a new factoring technique called uniform reduction, in which the environment is viewed as a collection of overlapping instances of schematic environments, each containing the minimal set of objects necessary to perform the task. The agent solves the task by c hoosing one of these instances and reducing the goal in the true environment to the solution of that schematic instance. To do this, the agent must keep track of which instance it is operating on as it goes along. This could be accomplished with internal memory, of course, but then the agent w ould need more and more memory as it performs more and more tasks concurrently. We will show that by structuring its activity, the agent can make this information manifest in the environment, thus storing" the information in the world.
Single-Material Worlds
We will start by de ning the schematic environment for Toast. The environment has exactly one material to be cooked and one of each tool needed to cook it. To simplify further, we will start by ignoring even the tools. Then we will 1. Solve the no-tools case. 2. Reduce the self-resetting tools case to the no-tools case. 3. Reduce the general case to the self-resetting tools case.
Single-Material Worlds with No Tools
Since materials have linear chains as their state spaces, action in them is restricted, to say the least. In the case of an egg, we might h a ve the chain:
fresh break ! broken beat ! beaten heat ! cooked heat ! burnt
We will assume that the identity, or nop," action is always available in every state. This is not a trivial assumption. In any given state, only one non-trivial action can be executed, so action selection for an agent is trivial. When solving a DCP involving a single-material world one of the following must always hold:
The current state is a goal state, s o w e need only execute the identity action. The current state is a pregoal state: some goal state is later in the chain than the current state, so we can reach i t b y executing the unique action that brings us to the next state in the chain. The current state is a postgoal state: all goal states are earlier in the chain, so the problem is unsolvable. All that really matters in single-material worlds, therefore, is how many states there are and in which direction the goal lies relative to the current state. In a sense, there is only really one single-material world, or rather one class of them, namely the chains C n of given length: C n = f1; :::; ng; finc n ; i g Note this is just the same as the environment Z n , but without the actions that move backward along the chain.
Proposition 1 All single-material worlds of n states are reducible to C n Proof: Let E = S; A be the single-material environment. And so single-state-tool worlds are trivially reducible to tool-free worlds.
Single-Material Worlds with General Tools
The general tool environment is identical to the single-state tool environment, except that actions can change the states of tools in addition to the states of materials. We can solve the general tool case using a solution to the single-state tool case by resetting tools whenever they are dirtied.
The proof is simple, but requires that we formalize the notion of being a tool. Let E be an environment with a state space of the form S 1 S 2 ::: S n . Let a be an action of E and S i be a component of its state space. We will say a is independent of S i if a never changes S i and it has the same result regardless of the value of S i . a is focused on a component S i if it is independent of all other components.
S i is a tool if it has some privileged value ready i 2 S i such that: To reprise: we w ant to factor the environment i n to its individual objects and then describe Toast as a composite of techniques for operating on the individual factors. We cannot properly de ne environments as Cartesian products of individual objects de ned in isolation because we h a ve n o w ay of expressing actions involving multiple objects. We can, h o wever, de ne a set of objects in the context of a minimal, schematic environment containing one copy o f e a c h object. Having done so, we n o w w ant to recapture the notion of an environment being some kind of product of objects of di erent t ypes. We will do this by showing that an environment with two eggs can be thought o f a s t wo o verlapping copies of an environment with one egg; the copies di er only in the choice of the egg. We will treat environments as having state spaces formed as products of the state spaces of their objects. A state of the environment is a tuple of the states of its objects. A binding of the schematic environment to the real environment is a particular kind of projection from the complex environment to the schematic, one which is also a reduction. If all reasonable projections are valid bindings, then we will say the environment is uniformly reducible to the schematic environment.
Bindings and Uniform Reducibility
Let E 0 and E beenvironments with state spaces built as Cartesian products of a family of disjoint sets fS i g. The S i might represent the state spaces of object types like egg and fork. E 0 and E would then each h a ve state spaces make of up some number of copies of egg and fork.
We will say that a projection from E 0 to E is simple if every component of its result is a component of its argument. That is s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; :::; s n = s i 1 ; s i 2 ; :::; s im for some i 1 ; :::; i m in 1; n . Thus takes a E 0 -state, s 0 , probably throws away some of its components, and possibly rearranges the rest to form a new tuple. For example, might single out a particular egg's state and or a particular fork's state and throw the other state components away. When a projection is simple, we can de ne a kind of inverse for it, which w e will call its back-projection. We will de ne the back-projection, , s; s 0 , of to bethe function whose result is s 0 with those components that keeps replaced by their corresponding components from s. That is, the implementation of an E-action is simply 's back-projection composed with that action and .
The proof follows from the de nitions of simple projection and back-projection. We will say that E 0 is uniformly reducible to E if every simple projection from E 0 to E is a binding.
Existential Goals
Toast is given the goal of putting some instance of a given material in its nished state. We will call this an existential goal because it is satis ed by exactly those environment states in which there exists an object of a speci ed type in a speci ed state. Let E;G b e a DCP and let E 0 be uniformly reducible to E. We de ne the existential goal 9 E; E 0 G of G in E 0 to be the set of states in E 0 that project under some binding to a goal state in E;G : The Toast algorithm implements a policy which is a composition of a schematic solution and a binding that maps it onto the real world. Consider the problem of cooking an egg. The schematic solution might b e : break the-egg into the-pan beat the-egg in the-pan using the-whisk heat the-egg in the-pan here the boldface verbs break, beat, and heat name actions. The italicized expressions theegg and the-pan name the objects state components that they a ect in the simpli ed world. The binding then determines objects in the real world to which those state components correspond. Given a binding, the main control structure need only remember the sequence break, beat, heat. Each of these may h a ve preconditions on the states of the tools i.e. the whisk needs to be clean, but they can be handled by reduction given policies for resetting the tools.
Binding Maps
Given the basic policy for cooking a single egg with a single pan and whisk, we can construct a policy to achieve the goal by composing the basic policy with a binding. This policy will solve the goal from any state in which the bound material is in a non-postgoal state. For a policy to solve the goal from any solvable state, it must be able to change bindings at run time. We will call a function from states to bindings a binding map.
One simple policy for choosing bindings is to impose some a priori ordering on the objects and always use the rst acceptable object in the ordering. The ordering might be random, or it might correspond to order imposed by a visual search mechanism. From a formal standpoint, the ordering does not matter, so we can, without loss of generality, use the left-to-right order of state components in the environment's state tuple. Let M 0 be some binding map that always chooses the leftmost pregoal material and uses some xed mapping for the tools we do not care what. This mapping allows us to construct a true solution, and one that requires no internal state in the agent: Thus far, we h a ve not considered what happens once a policy achieves its goal. Since agents rarely set out to achieve a goal and die, we n o w w ant to consider how to account for extended activity i n volving many goals. One important class of extended activities is when an agent transforms a whole class of identical objects. We will call this metabolizing the class. Metabolism can beuseful or it can make extra work: cooking 100 eggs is useful, at least if you are feeding a lot of people; dirtying 100 forks, however, probably means you have t o w ash them all.
Whether a policy metabolizes an object class depends in large part on the binding map it uses. The policy p M 0 metabolizes its materials because the material being worked on ceases to be the leftmost pregoal material as soon as it arrives in a goal state. When this happens, M 0 changes bindings and the agent starts to work on a di erent object. Policy p never actually sees a material in a goal state. Of course, the property o f being leftmost" is an artifact of our formalism. What matters to the property of metabolism is simply that the binding map implement some ordering on the instances of the material and always choose the minimum under that ordering of the objects that are in pre-goal states. Such an ordering might beimplemented by the agent visually scanning its work surface for an uncooked egg, but always scanning left-to-right and top-to-bottom. We will return to these issues in section 8.
Other binding maps lead to other kinds of behavior, some of which are pathological. If the binding map always chooses the same binding, then metabolism ceases. If the binding map always chooses uncooked eggs but doesn't impose any ordering on them, it might start cooking an in nite number of eggs without ever actually nishing any one of them.
Metabolism is also an issue for tool use. To metabolize its materials, p M 0 must repeatedly reset its tools. An alternate policy is to metabolize the tools too. Let us de ne M 1 to be the binding map that uses not only the leftmost pregoal material but also the leftmost reset tools. Then clearly, p M 1 s = A M 1 s p M 1 ss is a solution from any state for which M 1 is de ned. This policy treats tools as disposable. So long as there is an in nite supply of fresh tools, p will see a succession of states in which tools are in their reset states. It will never need to execute a resetting action and so the environment is e ectively a single-state-tool environment. Thus the reduction of section 7.1.3 is unnecessary.
Multiple Goals: Interleaved Execution
Metabolism involves performing the same transformation uniformly to instances of the same type of object: cooking all the eggs, or cleaning dirtying all the forks. Often times, however, an agent will work toward di erent kinds of goals at once. This can often be done by interleaving the actions from solutions to the individual goals. We will say that an interleaving I is a function that returns one or the other of its rst two arguments, depending on a third state argument:
Is; p 1 ; p 2 2 f p 1 ; p 2 g; for all s When the last two arguments of I are policies, the result is itself a policy, s o w e will de ne the notation: I p 1 ;p 2 s = Is; p 1 ; p 2 s If we wanted to simultaneously make toast and cook an egg, then a goodinterleaving of a toast-making policy and an egg-cooking policy would be one that chose the egg-making policy whenever the egg had nished its current cooking step and so was ready to be ipped or removed from the pan and chose the toast-making policy when the egg was busy cooking. A bad interleaving would be one that always chose the toast-making policy.
An interleaving I is fair for p 1 and p 2 if starting from any state, I p 1 ;p 2 will after some nite number of steps have executed both p 1 and p 2 at least once. Finally, we will say that two bindings are independent if they map disjoint sets of components to their images. Binding independence is a special case of subgoal independence: two policies can't possibly interfere if they alter distinct state components. Fairness and binding independence are su cient conditions for an interleaving to solve a conjunctive goal:
Lemma 7 Let p 1 = A 1 p 0 1 1 and p 2 = A 2 p 0 2 2 be policies that solve the goals G 1 and G 2 , r espectively, and halt. If 1 and 2 are independent and I is a fair interleaving for p 1 and p 2 then I p 1 ;p 2 solves G 1 G 2 and halts. Proof: Since I is a fair interleaving, each of the two policies will be executed in nite time, regardless of starting state. By induction, for any n, there is a number of steps after which I is guaranteed to have executed at least n steps of each policy.
The policy p 1 is the composition of a policy p 0 1 for a state space S 1 with a binding. If p 1 solves G 1 and halts, then it must do so by h a ving p 0 1 solve G 1 and halt in some nite number of steps n. During execution, the environment goes through a series of states s 0 ; s 1 ; :::; s n which project under 1 to a series of states s 0 0 ; s 0 1 ; :::; s 0 n we claim that any execution of the interleaving I p 1 ;p 2 must bring the environment through a sequence of states that project under 1 to s 0 0 + ; s 0 1 + ; :::; s 0 n + ; ::: that is, a string of states in which s 0 0 appears at least once, then s 0 1 , appears at least once, and so on. The only state transitions that appear are from some s 0 i to itself or to s 0 i+1 .
Suppose it were otherwise. Then there must be a point at which this series is broken: Then we h a ve that p 0 1 s 0 i = s 6 = s 0 i+1 , a contradiction. Case 2: p 2 executed the transition.
Then p 2 has changed one of the state components mapped by 1 and so 2 and 1 are not independent, a contradiction. Thus the interleaving solves G 1 . By the same reasoning, it must halt in G 1 , since p 1 halts in G 1 . Also by the same reasoning, it must solve G 2 and halt, and hence, must solve the intersection and halt. 2
A useful corollary to this is that when the same policy is applied under two independent bindings, the bindings can be safely interleaved, that is, interleaving commutes with binding:
Corollary 2 If p 1 = A 1 p 1 and p 2 = A 2 p 2 be p olicies that solve the goals G 1 and G 2 , r espectively, and halt, and I is a fair interleaving for p 1 and p 2 , then A I 1 ; 2 p I 1 ; 2 solves G 1 G 2 and halts.
Implementing Policies and Bindings
We h a ve modeled Toast's behavior as a composition of various bindings and interleavings with a basic policy for a schematic environment. In the case of Toast, the basic policy is simple enough to beimplemented by table-lookup. The hard part is implementing the bindings and interleavings given realistic limitations on short-term memory and perceptual bandwidth.
One approach would be to assume a relatively complete representation of the world. Each egg would be represented by a logical constant and its state would be represented by a set of propositions involving that constant. A binding would be implemented as a frame structure or a set of variables that point at the logical constants. The problem is that this approach presupposes the underlying perceptual and motor systems maintain a correspondence between logical constants and eggs in the world. When one of the eggs changes, the visual system has to know to belooking at it and to update the assertions about the egg in the model. This is not an assumption to betaken lightly. The capacity of the human perceptual system to keep track of objects in the world is extremely limited. Ballard et al. 1995found that their experimental subjects adopt strategies that minimized the amount o f w orld state they needed to track internally, preferring to rescan the environment when information is needed rather than memorize it in advance. The environment could even be modi ed during saccadic eye m o vements without the subjects noticing.
An alternative is to treat the limitations of the body, its locality in space, and its limited attentional and motor resources as a resource for implementing bindings directly. A person can visually focus on one object, stand in one place, and grasp at most a few objects at any one time. The orientation of the body's parts relative to the environment can be used to encode the selection of objects being operated on at the moment. In other words, it can implement a binding. Actions of the body, gaze shifts, and movements to new places can be used to shift that binding.
Another alternative is to use the states and relationships of objects in the world to keep track of bindings. An egg is being cooked if it is in the frying pan. A fork is available for use if it is in the drawer, but not if it is in the sink waiting to be washed.
In this section, we will model the use of the body and conventions to implement bindings and interleavings. To simplify the presentation and to beconcrete, we will focus on materials, particularly eggs.
Binding, Deixis, and Gaze
To a rst approximation, people can only visually recognize objects at which they are directly looking. People achieve the illusion of direct access to arbitrary objects by rapidly changing their gaze direction. Thus in addition to the normal state of the environment, our lived world contains an additional state component, our gaze direction. Since we can normally change our gaze direction without changing the world, and vice versa, our lived world E 0 can be separated into a parallel product of the objective e n vironment and our gaze direction: E 0 = E kD Our access to this world is through our gaze, which allows us to focus in on one particular object at a time. Our gaze implements a binding, or more precisely, a binding map, since it depends on the direction of gaze. If we model gaze direction as a number indicating which object is presently foveated, we h a ve that: gaze s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ; d = s d A person could implement a single-object binding just by xating the object they wish to bind. First they would set the D component to some egg, and then use D as their binding. Since D is really a binding map, however, rather than a true binding, the agent must pervasively structure its activity so as to ensure that its gaze need never be redirected.
Binding and Convention
In general, agents must maintain bindings through some sort of convention, whether it is the structuring of their internal memory, as in the case of a problem solver, or the structuring of their activity. In the case of gaze above, the agent maintains the binding through a convention about the spatial relation between its eye and the object it is binding. All versions of Toast to date have maintained bindings using conventions about simulated spatial arrangement or the states of objects.
One reason Toast cannot rely solely on gaze binding is that the technique breaks down when binding multiple objects. The agent m ust continually move its gaze among the objects of interest and so some additional convention must beintroduced to ensure that when its gaze leaves the egg and later returns, it always returns to the same egg. This assumes, of course, that Toast must return to the same egg. In some tasks it may su ce for Toast to return to some functionally equivalent egg. If it is preparing three fried eggs and its attention is distracted while preparing to break the second one, it is alright if its attention returns to the third egg, so long as it gets back to the second egg eventually.
State conventions
The original version of Toast used the convention eggs were bound to a cooking task i they were not in their starting unbroken state. Eggs were therefore bound using the binding map Toast s = the state of the unique egg in s that is in an unbroken state which the agent can implement by rst visually searching for an unbroken egg, and then using gaze . By corollary 2, the interleaving of the cooking of multiple eggs can be accomplished by interleaving the bindings of the eggs. For example, we might assume that the visual system searched non-deterministically or in a round-robin fashion for eggs. Any fair interleaving will su ce.
Spatial conventions
Later on in our development o f Toast, w e found it useful to adopt the convention that eggs were bound to a cooking task i they were located in a designated workspace. Cooking eggs are on the counter or in the frying pan, while idle eggs are in the refrigerator. This convention lets the agent use space as an external memory for binding information. To bind the egg, the agent faces the workspace and performs visual search for an egg. Any egg it nds will be an egg being cooked, since idle eggs will be out of view.
This still leaves open the issue of fairness. An extreme but elegant solution to the fairness problem is to use multiple workspaces and employ the convention that each workspace de nes a unique binding. To c o o k t wo eggs, the agent just works on cooking whatever egg is in front of it, but it spins in place so that it alternates between workspaces.
Formally, the environment then consists of two copies of the workspace and the objects therein plus an extra state component that determines which workspace the agent faces. The agent's perceptual system implements a binding map in which one or the other of the two workspaces is bound depending on the agent's orientation. Given a policy for cooking one egg in one workspace, we can construct a policy for cooking two eggs in two b y interleaving the policy with a ipping" operation that switches the workspaces:
Proposition 4 Let E = S; A be an environment, p be a policy that solves some goal G in E and halts, and let D be an environment with two states, 0 and 1, and two actions, i the identity and f l i p which moves the environment into the opposite state from its present bindings 0 and 1 , a n y fair interleaving of p M D with p f l i p is equivalent to some interleaving of p 0 , p 1 and p f l i p . We w ould like to show that this interleaving is also fair, that is, that each of p 0 and p 1 will get run in nite time. We can see this from the fact that with each execution of p f l i p switches M D from one binding to another. An objection is that this leaves open the possibility that that p f l i p will always get run twice in a row, thus returning the environment t o its original state and so preventing M D from switching bindings. This cannot occur, however, since it would introduce a loop, causing the interleaving to run p f l i p forever, never running p M D , and so violating the assumption of fairness of the interleaving of p M D and p f l i p . Thus the interleaving of p 0 , p 1 and p f l i p must befair. Now note that p 0 solves the goal G S f 0; 1g and halts, p 1 solves the goal S G f 0; 1g and halts, and p f l i p solves the goal G G f 0; 1g and halts. Thus by lemma 7, the interleaving solves the intersection of these goals, which i s G G f 0; 1g. 2
Reductions and the Structure of Toast
We have shown how the cooking problem can be solved by a series of reductions and conventions. Binding allows the reduction of the problem to a schematic world in which action is greatly restricted and so action selection is greatly simpli ed. This world can be further reduced, given algorithms for resetting tools, to a world in which tools are always reset. This world, in turn, is equivalent to a world in which there is only one object, the material being cooked, and only one action can betaken at any given time. Such actions can be found by table lookup.
Multiple materials can be cooked by i n terleaving the execution of processes for cooking the individual materials. Interleaving the processes is equivalent, however, to interleaving the bindings, so the schematic-world algorithm need not even beaware that it is pursuing multiple goals. If tool bindings are continuously changed as tools are dirtied then tools are e ectively disposable, tools e ectively have only a single state, and the separate reduction from general tools to single-state tools is unnecessary. Material bindings can be maintained by a n y n umber of conventions involving the states and or positions of objects.
In short, we can describe a Toast algorithm as a path through a network of possible simpli cations of the problem see Figure 6 in which every path from the actual world to the idealized single-object world de nes a possible and correct version of the Toast algorithm.
Cognitive Autopoiesis
In formalizing our ideas about binding and gaze, we h a ve been moving toward a theory of intentionality that depends on the agent's embedding in its world, rather than solely upon its internal models of that world. An agent can keep track of particular objects in terms of their functional signi cance the roles that they play in the ongoing activity. And it can keep track of the tools and materials associated with di erent tasks by keeping them in di erent locations, for example di erent regions of a countertop. So far, however, our ideas on the subject have been limited to very simple cases, for example an agent switching its visual focus back and forth between two objects. To model the more complex patterns that are found in everyday life, we need a much better theory of the world in which we are embedded. This theory is partially a matter of biology and physics, of course, but it is also a matter of cultural practices for organizing activities in space. In this section, we would like t o s k etch a more general theory of these matters using the concept of cognitive autopoiesis."
For Maturana and Varela 1988 , autopoiesis refers to the processes by which organisms act on their environments in order to provide the conditions for their own continued functioning. Cognitive autopoiesis refers to the active means by which agents structure their environments in order to provide the conditions for the own cognitive activities. These include most basically the means by which agents provide for the factorability of environments: engaging in customary activities, using the customary tools and materials for them, partitioning the activities in the customary ways, and so on. But it also includes a range of more subtle phenomena. Kirsh 1995, for example, has drawn the useful distinction between actions that aim at achieving functional goals beating eggs, sweeping oors and actions that aim at facilitating cognition setting out the right numberof eggs at the beginning, opening the curtains so that dust will bemore visible. Actions can, of course, serve both purposes, for example when one chooses to boil water in a kettle rather than a saucepan: each strategy achieves the result, but the latter will also provide a sign that it is possible to take the next action, for example preparing tea. Stabilization actions Hammond et al., 1995 also provide the cognitive conditions for other actions. One might, for example, develop the habit of leaving items by the door the moment one realizes that they need to be taken in to work.
These phenomena help in understanding what is inadequate about the concept of the environment." If one conceptualizes the environment" as a monolithic whole, perhaps the way it looks when viewed from an airplane, or else the way it looks when understood through the peephole of a momentary vector of sense-perceptions, it begins to seem arbitrary, c haotic, or hostile. In a certain sense it seems static, as if it has an anatomy but no physiology. But in fact the phenomena of cognitive autopoiesis reveal that the lifeworld has a great deal of living structure, and that this structure is actively maintained by agents while also providing crucial preconditions for their own cognition. Indeed it is hard to draw a clear line around an agent's cognition; if we trace the sequence of causal events that led a given agent to pour a pitcher of milk on a particular moment, this sequence will lead back and forth between the agent and its customary surroundings. It is almost as if these surroundings were an extension of one's mind.
Cognitive autopoiesis is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon and no single theory will su ce to explain it. One useful way to think about cognitive autopoiesis is spatially, in terms of a series of bu er zones between the embodied agent and the putative dangers and complexities of the environment." For people whose lives are similar to our own, these bu er zones can be conveniently sorted under six headings:
The body itself: its posture, its markings, things that might be attached to it or hung from it, prostheses, arti cial markings, the things one is holding in one's hands, and so on. All of these things can serve as forms of memory, for example as a way to remember what activity one was in the middle of before some momentary distraction. The body's motility also makes possible a wide range of voluntary recon gurations of one's physical relationship to things, for example to get a better view or better leverage.
Clothing, including pockets, purses, money belts, hats, and so on. Everyone carries around various objects in ways that draw on customary practices and artifacts cash in wallets, keys inpockets, watch on wrist, etc while con guring these things in an evolving personal way k eys in left pocket and money in right, tissues in the hip pocket of one's coat, spare change in the outer ap of the backpack, and so on.
Temporary workspaces that one occupies to perform a particular activity o ver a bounded period. In repairing a bicycle, for example, one might spread tools and bicycle parts about on the oor in patterns that have a cognitive signi cance in relationship to one's own body and cognitive and other states Chapman & Agre, 1986 . One is not claiming this space as a permanent colony it might belocated on a patio in a public park, for example, but one does lay claim to the space long enough to perform a customarily bounded task.
One's own private spaces: home, desk, o ce, car, trunks of stu kept in someone else's attic, and so forth. These spaces serve n umerous functions, of course, but among these are the cognitive functions of providing stable locations over long periods of time for tools and materials, storage places for stu that needs to be kept in adequate supply, practices for regulating other people's access to the stu , and so on. These stable conditions are actively maintained and provide the background for a wide variety of more transient activities.
Spaces that are shared with other people within stable, time-extended relationships. These spaces include living rooms, kitchens, shared o ce spaces, and so forth. The line between the private and shared spaces clearly depends on the particular culture and set of relationships, and the distinction might not be clear. The point is that the cognitive functions of the spaces are maintained through shared practices such a s letting someone know when you borrow their stu .
Public spaces and the whole range of customary artifacts and practices that regulate activities in them. Public spaces o er fewer guarantees than private and shared spaces, but they do include a wide variety of supports to cognition, including signs and architectural conventions. It is also possible to use one's bodyand clothing to carry artifacts that provide cognitive support for dealing with public spaces.
These bu er zones do not always o er perfect protection from harm or complete support for the pursuit of goals. Shared and public spaces can be sites of con ict, for example, and these con icts can include involuntary disruption or destruction of one's body and the other bu er zones that are customarily under one's own private control. A serious theory of activity must include an account of these phenomena as well, which are usually just as orderly in their own way a s a n ything else.
In any event, the nested bu er zones of ordinary life participate in a large metabolism that continually interweaves cognitive and functional purposes. Among these purposes is learning. Just as the adaptation of body parts and tools to customary activities helps channel action in customary directions, so does the existing background of objects, spaces, and practices help channel the actions of children and other newcomers in customary directions on a larger scale. Caretakers regularly construct customized types of bu er zones around the young, for example, so that it is di cult or impossible for them to get into anything that could cause harm. The lifeworld of a child, for example, di ers from that of an adult who can reach up to the cookie jar and into the locked cupboard where the roach spray i s kept. A growing literature has investigated the processes of cognitive apprenticeship Rogo , 1990, situated learning Lave & W enger, 1991 , distributed cognition Hutchins, 1995 Salomon, 1993 , and shared construction of activities Gri n & Cole, 1989 that go on in these systematically restrictive and supportive lifeworlds.
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored some of the ways in which the structure of the lifeworld supports agents' cognition, and we h a ve suggested how this analysis might be expanded to cover a wider range of phenomena. Much w ork obviously remains to be done. Perhaps the most signi cant part of this work concerns a fundamental assumption of lifeworld analysis: that people use objects in customary ways. This is a plausible enough rst approximation, but it is not always true. Faced with a di culty that goes beyond the capacities of the usual practices and the artifacts that are readily available, people frequently improvise. The handle of a spoon might be used to pry open a lid, a pen might be used to sh acorns out of an exhaust duct, a book might be used to provide backing for a sheet of paper one is writing on, or a protruding section of a car's bumper might b e b e n t straight b y deliberately driving the car into a concrete wall. In these cases the underlying physical a ordances of an object show through" beyond their ready-to-hand appropriation in routine patterns of interaction. These underlying a ordances can also show through in situations of breakdown, for example when a tool breaks or proves inadequate to a job. In such cases, people confer improvised meanings upon artifacts. Such phenomena are particularly important in conversation, in which each utterance is interpreted in the context created by previous utterances, while simultaneously helping to create the context for interpretation of successive utterances as well Edwards & Mercer, 1987; Atkinson & Heritage, 1984 . The point is not that the lifeworld does not exist, but rather that it is something actively created as well as something adapted to through socialization. One challenge for future research i s t o learn how computational methods might help in modeling such phenomena|and how such phenomena might help us to rethink basic ideas about computation.
Focus. An action is focused on a state component if it only alters that component see section 7.1.3.
Material. An object environment whose state space is a chain see section 7. A . For a simple reduction from an environment E 0 to E, the function mapping an action a from E to the action that implements it in E 0 p. 122.
C n . The chain-environment o f n states p. 127.
E. An environment.
9 E; E 0 G. G a goal of E and E 0 uniformly reducible to E. The existential goal of G in E 0 : the set of all E 0 -states that map to a goal state under some binding p. 130. E 1 * E 2 . The serial product. The Cartesian product of E 1 and E 2 in which actions from the two e n vironments must be taken separately p. 120. E 1 kE 2 . The parallel product. The Cartesian product of E 1 and E 2 in which actions from the two e n vironments must be taken simultaneously p. 120. L E; E 0 . E 0 an environment uniformly reducible to E The leftmost-ready binding map from E 0 to E p. 131. p. A policy. p E; G . The standard policy for single-material environment E and goal G p. 127.
S. The singleton environment the environment with exactly one state. Used to represent a self-resetting tool p. 128.
